VIETNAM: RELEASE OF LONG-AWAITED GUIDANCE ON COMPETITION LAW

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July 10, 2020

The long-waited guidance on the Competition Law — the Decree 35/2020/ND-CP (Decree 35) — was issued on March 24, 2020 with effect from May 15, 2020, and casts light on certain prominent provisions of the Competition Law, such as economic concentration.

Under the Competition Law, economic concentration includes, among other things, acquisition of a company to the extent of controlling or dominating the acquired company or its business line. Decree 35 now further defines “controlling or dominating” as:

  • holding up to 50 percent voting right shares, or 50 percent total assets related to any or all business line, of acquired company; or
  • having right to, directly or indirectly, appoint or remove majority of member(s) or chairman of the board, or chief executive officer, or amend the charter, or decide critical issues, of acquired company.

Under Decree 35, the thresholds that trigger mandatory pre-merger notification include:

  • involved party’s total assets in the Vietnam market exceeding VND3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year;
  • involved party’s total turnover exceeding VND3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year;
  • the value of the transaction exceeding VND1,000 billion (not applicable in case of transaction outside the territory of Vietnam); or
  • combined market share exceeding 20 percent in preceding fiscal year.

These thresholds are more stringent for transactions involving credit institutions, securities or insurance companies, in particular:

  • involved parties’ total assets in the Vietnam market exceeding VND15,000 billion;
  • involved credit institutions’ total assets exceeding 20 percent of the whole credit institution system;
  • turnover of involved insurance companies exceeding VND10,000 billion, or of involved securities companies exceeding VND3,000 billion;
  • involved credit institutions’ turnover exceeding 20 percent of the whole credit institution system;
  • value of transaction involving credit institution exceeding VND3,000 billion or 20 percent of credit institution system’s total charter capital in the preceding fiscal year; or
  • the combined market share exceeding 20 percent in preceding fiscal year.

Screenshot 2020-06-10 at 3.53.27 PM

After the 30 days upon the pre-merger notification filling, an economic concentration transaction may be implemented if it falls under either of below cases, among others:

  • the combined market share is below 20 percent;
  • the combined market share exceeds 20 percent but post-merger aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares is less than 1,800;
  • the combined market share exceeds 20 percent, and post-merger aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares exceeds 1,800, but the amplitude increase of the aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares between pre-merger and post-merger is below 100; or
  • involved parties in relevant supply/manufacturing chain have 20 percent combined market share.

Otherwise, an economic concentration shall undergo an official review to determine whether it may cause significant competition-restraining impact and subsequently should be banned. The official review shall base on, among others, market share combination, threat to cause or reinforce market power, ability to increase ability for correlation or collusion, relationship between involved parties in the manufacturing and supply chain, competition advantage, ability to increase price or profit margin ratio.

In addition, Decree 35 also introduces various criteria in determining the significant competition-restraining impact on market of a cartel conduct, including, among others, development of market share of involved parties, barriers to market access or expansion, restriction on research, development and technological innovations, increase of costs and time for customers to purchase goods or services.

In respect of competition dispute settlement, Decree 35 gives further detail on requirements on evidence collection, usage and examination. Decree 35 further provides for procedure on implementing certain interim injunctions during competition investigation.

https://www.inhousecommunity.com/article/vietnam-release-long-awaited-guidance-competition-law/

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Vietnam: Release of long-awaited guidance on Competition Law

July 10, 2020

The long-waited guidance on the Competition Law — the Decree 35/2020/ND-CP (Decree 35) — was issued on March 24, 2020 with effect from May 15, 2020, and casts light on certain prominent provisions of the Competition Law, such as economic concentration.

Under the Competition Law, economic concentration includes, among other things, acquisition of a company to the extent of controlling or dominating the acquired company or its business line. Decree 35 now further defines “controlling or dominating” as:

  • holding up to 50 percent voting right shares, or 50 percent total assets related to any or all business line, of acquired company; or
  • having right to, directly or indirectly, appoint or remove majority of member(s) or chairman of the board, or chief executive officer, or amend the charter, or decide critical issues, of acquired company.

Under Decree 35, the thresholds that trigger mandatory pre-merger notification include:

  • involved party’s total assets in the Vietnam market exceeding VND3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year;
  • involved party’s total turnover exceeding VND3,000 billion in the preceding fiscal year;
  • the value of the transaction exceeding VND1,000 billion (not applicable in case of transaction outside the territory of Vietnam); or
  • combined market share exceeding 20 percent in preceding fiscal year.

These thresholds are more stringent for transactions involving credit institutions, securities or insurance companies, in particular:

  • involved parties’ total assets in the Vietnam market exceeding VND15,000 billion;
  • involved credit institutions’ total assets exceeding 20 percent of the whole credit institution system;
  • turnover of involved insurance companies exceeding VND10,000 billion, or of involved securities companies exceeding VND3,000 billion;
  • involved credit institutions’ turnover exceeding 20 percent of the whole credit institution system;
  • value of transaction involving credit institution exceeding VND3,000 billion or 20 percent of credit institution system’s total charter capital in the preceding fiscal year; or
  • the combined market share exceeding 20 percent in preceding fiscal year.

Screenshot 2020-06-10 at 3.53.27 PM

After the 30 days upon the pre-merger notification filling, an economic concentration transaction may be implemented if it falls under either of below cases, among others:

  • the combined market share is below 20 percent;
  • the combined market share exceeds 20 percent but post-merger aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares is less than 1,800;
  • the combined market share exceeds 20 percent, and post-merger aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares exceeds 1,800, but the amplitude increase of the aggregate of square number of each involved parties’ market shares between pre-merger and post-merger is below 100; or
  • involved parties in relevant supply/manufacturing chain have 20 percent combined market share.

Otherwise, an economic concentration shall undergo an official review to determine whether it may cause significant competition-restraining impact and subsequently should be banned. The official review shall base on, among others, market share combination, threat to cause or reinforce market power, ability to increase ability for correlation or collusion, relationship between involved parties in the manufacturing and supply chain, competition advantage, ability to increase price or profit margin ratio.

In addition, Decree 35 also introduces various criteria in determining the significant competition-restraining impact on market of a cartel conduct, including, among others, development of market share of involved parties, barriers to market access or expansion, restriction on research, development and technological innovations, increase of costs and time for customers to purchase goods or services.

In respect of competition dispute settlement, Decree 35 gives further detail on requirements on evidence collection, usage and examination. Decree 35 further provides for procedure on implementing certain interim injunctions during competition investigation.

https://www.inhousecommunity.com/article/vietnam-release-long-awaited-guidance-competition-law/

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MONTHLY LEGAL UPDATE – NOVEMBER 2019 – DECREE 75/2019

NEW REGULATIONS ON THE PENALTIES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS AGAINST COMPETITION LAWS

By Nguyen Tu Oanh
Legal Assistant

On 26 September 2019, the Government has promulgated the Decree No. 75/2019/ND-CP (the “Decree 75/2019”) on the penalties for administrative violations against regulations on competition which shall take effect from 01 December 2019 and replace the Decree No. 71/2014/NĐ-CP dated 21 July 2014 (the “Decree 71/2014”).

In general, the Decree 75/2019 has met the demand on and been consistent with the changes and new points in the Law on competition 2018 as follows:

The applicable subject of the Decree 75/2019 is similar to that one in the Law on competition 2018. Accordingly, Decree 75/2019 is applied for any relevant domestic and foreign authorities, organizations and individuals. It means that if a foreign organization violates the Law on competition 2018, the organization may be imposed a penalty under the Decree 75/2019.

The provisions in Decree 75/2019 on administrative violations against regulations of the competition law are more detailed than the same in Decree 71/2014. Particularly, the administrative violations against regulations of the competition law under the Decree 75/2019 including: (i) Violations against regulations on anti-competitive agreements; (ii) Violations against regulations on the abuse of dominant position or exclusive position; (iii) Violations against regulations on economic concentrations; (iv) Violations against regulations on unfair competition; (v) Violations against other provisions in the competition law.

Besides detailing violations against regulations of the competition law, Decree 75/2019 also sets forth the mitigating and aggravating circumstances into particulars (as stipulated previously in Article 85 of the Decree No. 116/2005/ND-CP). In which the mitigating circumstances mainly come from the voluntary in declaration, remedy for violations, the violations due to coercion or dependence on others, first-time violations. In contrary, the aggravating circumstances are applied for the organized violations, violation which has been committed for more than once or repeated, the deliberate concealment of violations…

The Decree 75/2019 has amended, supplemented the regulations on fines which are consistent with the changed provisions in the Law on competition 2018. Particularly, Decree 75/2019 stipulates separate maximum fines for each violation against regulations on anti-competitive agreements; regulations on the abuse of dominant position or exclusive position; and regulations on economic concentrations and the fine is calculated based on total turnover of the violating enterprise earned from the relevant market in the preceding fiscal year in which the violations are made. This provision helps competent authorities to define the fine amount to each violation accurately on its nature as well as to be easier for the application of fines to violations.

Another noteworthy point is the maximum fine to the violations against regulations on unfair competition under the Decree 75/2015 is increased ten times in comparison with the same in the Decree 71/2014, specifically it grew from VND 200,000,000 to VND 2,000,000,000. Such change shows the attention of the legislators to violations against regulations on unfair competition and their intention in controlling/restricting these violations on the market.

To satisfy new regulations of the Law on competition 2018, Decree 75/2019 has added provisions on the violations and fines to actions of providing information for or mobilizing, inciting, coercing or enabling enterprises to engage in anti-competition or unfair competition activities. Accordingly, the main penalty to the violations could be up to VND 50,000,000, additionally the violating entities may be imposed other additional penalties and remedies such as the public correction of information.

The competent authorities for deciding penalties to violations are National Competition Committee, Inspections or the chief Inspector of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, of which National Competition Committee is a new authority established by the mergence between Competition and Consumer Authority and Competition Committee.

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